Applied Microeconomics
Applied Microeconomics
The Applied Microeconomics research group unites researchers working on a broad array of topics within such areas as labour economics, economics of education, health economics, family economics, urban economics, environmental economics, and the economics of science and innovation. The group operates in close collaboration with the CAGE Research Centre.
The group participates in the CAGE seminar on Applied Economics, which runs weekly on Tuesdays at 2:15pm. Students and faculty members of the group present their ongoing work in two brown bag seminars, held weekly on Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 1pm. Students, in collaboration with faculty members, also organise a bi-weekly reading group in applied econometrics on Thursdays at 1pm. The group organises numerous events throughout the year, including the Research Away Day and several thematic workshops.
Our activities
Work in Progress seminars
Tuesdays and Wednesdays 1-2pm
Students and faculty members of the group present their work in progress in two brown bag seminars. See below for a detailed scheduled of speakers.
Applied Econometrics reading group
Thursdays (bi-weekly) 1-2pm
Organised by students in collaboration with faculty members. See the Events calendar below for further details
People
Academics
Academics associated with the Applied Microeconomics Group are:
Research Students
Events
CRETA Seminar - Rohit Lamba (Cornell)
Title: Accountability without Saints
Abstract: Can the power to replace leaders sustain good governance when no leader is intrinsically motivated? I study a dynamic accountability game in which an evaluator retains or replaces an incumbent based on public performance reports. When at least one type governs well by nature, Bayesian learning selects for good leaders. Without such "saints," accountability collapses: accumulated trust erodes the evaluator's willingness to replace; career incentives vanish, and no coherent equilibrium sustains effort. Committed periodic review, that is, a fixed rule that holds every incumbent to the same standard regardless of reputation, restores positive governance by preserving career incentives across terms. The governance frontier, the best achievable governance under such rules, falls short of what saints achieve and is characterized in closed form. The impossibility extends beyond the baseline finite-signal model to Gaussian signals, suggesting the trust trap is a general feature of Bayesian accountability.