Applied Microeconomics
Applied Microeconomics
The Applied Microeconomics research group unites researchers working on a broad array of topics within such areas as labour economics, economics of education, health economics, family economics, urban economics, environmental economics, and the economics of science and innovation. The group operates in close collaboration with the CAGE Research Centre.
The group participates in the CAGE seminar on Applied Economics, which runs weekly on Tuesdays at 2:15pm. Students and faculty members of the group present their ongoing work in two brown bag seminars, held weekly on Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 1pm. Students, in collaboration with faculty members, also organise a bi-weekly reading group in applied econometrics on Thursdays at 1pm. The group organises numerous events throughout the year, including the Research Away Day and several thematic workshops.
Our activities
Work in Progress seminars
Tuesdays and Wednesdays 1-2pm
Students and faculty members of the group present their work in progress in two brown bag seminars. See below for a detailed scheduled of speakers.
Applied Econometrics reading group
Thursdays (bi-weekly) 1-2pm
Organised by students in collaboration with faculty members. See the Events calendar below for further details
People
Academics
Academics associated with the Applied Microeconomics Group are:
Research Students
Events
CRETA Theory Seminar - Eduard Talamas (IESE Business School)
Title: Nash-Credible Bargaining
Abstract - Bargaining in a given team often involves outside options determined by bargaining in alternative teams, which depend, in turn, on bargaining in alternative teams, and so on. To resolve the interdeterminacy caused by circular outside options, I introduce a new concept - Nash credibility - that requires the outside option of each player in any given coalition to be the maximum she can justify using Nash bargaining in an alternative coalition without appealing to her own outside option there. Nash credibiity uniquely pins down outside options - and hence the Nash bargaining solution - in every coalition. I represent the set of coalitions as a network that maps the sources of Nash-credible outside options. This network is acyclic, and determines how shocks propagate via outside options. The effect of a marginal increase in the surplus of one coalition on the Nash-credible bargaining solution in another one is determined by the total weight of all even-length paths minus odd-length paths connecting them.