Postgraduate "Work In Progress" Seminar
Postgraduate Work-In-Progress SeminarA weekly seminar for Philosophy postgraduates to present their in-progress work, followed by a well-spirited trip to the pub. OverviewThe WIP provides a risk-free and supportive space for postgraduates to present their work and receive feedback from other graduates and faculty.
Attendance optional but highly recommended. All postgraduates are welcome to present or attend -- whether MA, MPhil, PhD, Visitors, etc. Useful InfoThe WIP is a unique opportunity for graduates to develop their presenting and writing skills, take risks, test out ideas, and receive constructive feedback from peers.
Presentations need not be watertight or polished pieces at all. You are encouraged to present work at all stages of the writing process. Should you present?Are you a postgraduate? Then yes, you should present. |
NEXT TALKRozemin Keshvani (PhD) Kant Thursday 25/06/2026 5pm - 6:15pm S1.50 ORGANISERS |
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WMA Mini Workshop: Perception and Objectivity
Naomi Eilan: 'Molyneux's Question Revisited: On the Role of Physical Objects'
In his ground-breaking paper on 'Molyneux's Question', Gareth Evans clears major pathways in what he describes as the 'minefield' of interconnected problems it raises. Professor Eilan will be suggesting he was right about some of the fundamental challenges raised by the Question - which turn on providing an explanation of the unity and objectivity of our shape concepts and perceptions in a way that takes proper account of empirical and theoretical work in psychology. However, she will suggest, his arguments for a positive answer to the Question don't work, due mainly to (a) his general account of perception and (b) the role he gives spatial location in securing the unity and objectivity of shape perception. Professor Eilan sketches an alternative reason for adopting a modified positive response, drawing partly on recent psychological work on subjects whose sight has been restored and partly on suggestions Evans makes in 'Things Without the Mind'.
Professor Michael Martin: 'Eliding Awareness: The Origins of Intentionalism'
Tyler Burge complains that Evans conflates two different projects and misinterprets Stawson's aims (210,pp181-183). Burge is certainly correct that in 'Things Without the Mind' Evans effects a re-working of Strawson's project in Individuals, Ch.2. But to treat this as an error of interpretation is to ignore the debate taking place between the two: in Evans's commentary; in Strawson's response; and in Evans's only posthumously published 'Molyneux's Question'.
What elements of Strawson's picture is Evans picking up? Where does the discontinuity arise, and what is Strawson's reaction? In spelling these out, Professor Martin suggests that we see the beginnings of the intentionalist turn in the philosophy of perception, which is first articulated in the early 1980s and then becomes dominant in the 1990s and beyond.