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Postgraduate "Work In Progress" Seminar

Postgraduate Work-In-Progress Seminar

A weekly seminar for Philosophy postgraduates to present their in-progress work, followed by a well-spirited trip to the pub.


Overview

The WIP provides a risk-free and supportive space for postgraduates to present their work and receive feedback from other graduates and faculty.

  • When: Every Thursday (5pm to 6:15pm)
  • Where: Room S1.50 (Social Sciences Building, First Floor)
  • What: Presentation + Q&A

Attendance optional but highly recommended. All postgraduates are welcome to present or attend -- whether MA, MPhil, PhD, Visitors, etc.


Useful Info

The WIP is a unique opportunity for graduates to develop their presenting and writing skills, take risks, test out ideas, and receive constructive feedback from peers.

  • Presentation: 30 minutes
  • Open Discussion / Q&A: 40 minutes
  • Material: Work in progress (essay drafts, thesis sections, a substantial set of notes, ... ).
  • Style: Flexible. Slides, handouts, or neither.
  • Audience: No prior reading or background knowledge expected. All are encouraged to attend and present (including visiting postgraduates).

Presentations need not be watertight or polished pieces at all. You are encouraged to present work at all stages of the writing process.


Should you present?

Are you a postgraduate? Then yes, you should present.

 
NEXT TALK

Rozemin Keshvani

(PhD)

Kant


Thursday 25/06/2026

5pm - 6:15pm

S1.50


ORGANISERS

Tiago Rodrigues

Lucas Menezes 

   

 

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Philosophy Department Post-Graduate Work in Progress Seminar: Simon Wimmer - 'Knowledge as a Factual Attitude'

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Location: Room S0.28, Social Sciences Building

Simon Wimmer will present his paper on 'Knowledge as a Factual Attitude',

Abstract:

This paper introduces a puzzle concerning knowledge and belief and argues that to resolve the puzzle we should reject the orthodox claim that knowledge is a propositional attitude. To bolster the case for my response to the puzzle, I argue that the most prominent alternative proposal, due to Jeff King and Wataru Uegaki, fails to resolve the puzzle because it relies on a false conception of the relationship between acquaintance and so-called 'propositional' knowledge. I close by suggesting that my response to the puzzle has important consequences for epistemology and philosophy of Mind; it undermines the widespread project of understanding the nature of knowledge in terms of belief and casts doubt on a recent response to Jackson's knowledge argument by Tim Crane.

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