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Postgraduate "Work In Progress" Seminar

Postgraduate Work-In-Progress Seminar

A weekly seminar for Philosophy postgraduates to present their in-progress work, followed by a well-spirited trip to the pub.


Overview

The WIP provides a risk-free and supportive space for postgraduates to present their work and receive feedback from other graduates and faculty.

  • When: Every Thursday (5pm to 6:15pm)
  • Where: Room S1.50 (Social Sciences Building, First Floor)
  • What: Presentation + Q&A

Attendance optional but highly recommended. All postgraduates are welcome to present or attend -- whether MA, MPhil, PhD, Visitors, etc.


Useful Info

The WIP is a unique opportunity for graduates to develop their presenting and writing skills, take risks, test out ideas, and receive constructive feedback from peers.

  • Presentation: 30 minutes
  • Open Discussion / Q&A: 40 minutes
  • Material: Work in progress (essay drafts, thesis sections, a substantial set of notes, ... ).
  • Style: Flexible. Slides, handouts, or neither.
  • Audience: No prior reading or background knowledge expected. All are encouraged to attend and present (including visiting postgraduates).

Presentations need not be watertight or polished pieces at all. You are encouraged to present work at all stages of the writing process.


Should you present?

Are you a postgraduate? Then yes, you should present.

 
NEXT TALK

Rozemin Keshvani

(PhD)

Kant


Thursday 25/06/2026

5pm - 6:15pm

S1.50


ORGANISERS

Tiago Rodrigues

Lucas Menezes 

   

 

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Postgraduate Work in Progress Seminar

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Location: S0.17

Simon Wimmer Williamson on belief: How (not) to go knowledge-first about belief

While knowledge-first accounts of a variety of phenomena, for instance the norm of assertion and justified belief, have received much attention, knowledge-first accounts of belief have received very little. This paper aims to remedy this situation. It discusses two knowledge-first accounts of belief, based on Williamson (2000, pp.46-47)’s tentative suggestion that to believe p is “to treat p as if one knew p”. Here is the plan. In §§2-4 I introduce the two accounts I focus on. Then (§5), I argue that they are subject to counterexample: given some orthodox assumptions, both imply that one believes many propositions that are metaphysically impossible to know, which we would not expect one to believe. By way of conclusion, §6 then introduces an amendment to the accounts, which helps one of them avoid the counterexample.

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