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Postgraduate "Work In Progress" Seminar

Postgraduate Work-In-Progress Seminar

A weekly seminar for Philosophy postgraduates to present their in-progress work, followed by a well-spirited trip to the pub.


Overview

The WIP provides a risk-free and supportive space for postgraduates to present their work and receive feedback from other graduates and faculty.

  • When: Every Thursday (5pm to 6:15pm)
  • Where: Room S1.50 (Social Sciences Building, First Floor)
  • What: Presentation + Q&A

Attendance optional but highly recommended. All postgraduates are welcome to present or attend -- whether MA, MPhil, PhD, Visitors, etc.


Useful Info

The WIP is a unique opportunity for graduates to develop their presenting and writing skills, take risks, test out ideas, and receive constructive feedback from peers.

  • Presentation: 30 minutes
  • Open Discussion / Q&A: 40 minutes
  • Material: Work in progress (essay drafts, thesis sections, a substantial set of notes, ... ).
  • Style: Flexible. Slides, handouts, or neither.
  • Audience: No prior reading or background knowledge expected. All are encouraged to attend and present (including visiting postgraduates).

Presentations need not be watertight or polished pieces at all. You are encouraged to present work at all stages of the writing process.


Should you present?

Are you a postgraduate? Then yes, you should present.

 
NEXT TALK

Rozemin Keshvani

(PhD)

Kant


Thursday 25/06/2026

5pm - 6:15pm

S1.50


ORGANISERS

Tiago Rodrigues

Lucas Menezes 

   

 

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Philosophy Department Colloquium: Léa Salje (Leeds)

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Location: OC1.07, Oculus Building

ABSTRACT:

Here is a seemingly true claim: uses of the first person concept systematically refer to their thinkers. Here is another: nothing outside this rule is ordinarily needed to settle questions of reference assignment for first person thought. As a result of these platitudes, the question who a given first person thought refers to almost never comes up. In this talk, Léa considers the extraordinary conditions of use of the first person concept in which it does. What follows (she will argue) is a surprising kind of referential indeterminacy in our uses of the first person concept that is normally kept out of sight by the ordinariness of the conditions of thought.

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