91

Skip to main content Skip to navigation

Postgraduate "Work In Progress" Seminar

Postgraduate Work-In-Progress Seminar

A weekly seminar for Philosophy postgraduates to present their in-progress work, followed by a well-spirited trip to the pub.


Overview

The WIP provides a risk-free and supportive space for postgraduates to present their work and receive feedback from other graduates and faculty.

  • When: Every Thursday (5pm to 6:15pm)
  • Where: Room S1.50 (Social Sciences Building, First Floor)
  • What: Presentation + Q&A

Attendance optional but highly recommended. All postgraduates are welcome to present or attend -- whether MA, MPhil, PhD, Visitors, etc.


Useful Info

The WIP is a unique opportunity for graduates to develop their presenting and writing skills, take risks, test out ideas, and receive constructive feedback from peers.

  • Presentation: 30 minutes
  • Open Discussion / Q&A: 40 minutes
  • Material: Work in progress (essay drafts, thesis sections, a substantial set of notes, ... ).
  • Style: Flexible. Slides, handouts, or neither.
  • Audience: No prior reading or background knowledge expected. All are encouraged to attend and present (including visiting postgraduates).

Presentations need not be watertight or polished pieces at all. You are encouraged to present work at all stages of the writing process.


Should you present?

Are you a postgraduate? Then yes, you should present.

 
NEXT TALK

Rozemin Keshvani

(PhD)

Kant


Thursday 25/06/2026

5pm - 6:15pm

S1.50


ORGANISERS

Tiago Rodrigues

Lucas Menezes 

   

 

Show all calendar items

Knowledge and Belief Seminar

- Export as iCalendar
Location: By Zoom

Guest Speaker: Guy Longworth (91)

Title: 'Unsettling Questions'

Abstract: "Should we expect someone who knows by seeing to be in a position positively to settle the questions “How do you know?” “Why do you think so?” or “Are you sure?"? I begin to address that large question by defending the following claims. We should not expect someone who knows by seeing that p to be in a position to know how they know that p (§2). However, we should expect someone who knows by seeing that p to have sufficient reasons for thinking that p, but—in light of the first claim—we should not expect their seeing what they do to figure amongst their reasons. A further issue that will figure in the background to the discussion here concerns how, if at all, sensory awareness of things can furnish one with reasons for thinking things so (§3). Despite the fact that one who knows by seeing need not know how they know and need not have amongst their reasons that they see what they do, still their seeing what they do can play an important role in establishing surety (§4)."

Show all calendar items

Let us know you agree to cookies