Postgraduate "Work In Progress" Seminar
Postgraduate Work-In-Progress SeminarA weekly seminar for Philosophy postgraduates to present their in-progress work, followed by a well-spirited trip to the pub. OverviewThe WIP provides a risk-free and supportive space for postgraduates to present their work and receive feedback from other graduates and faculty.
Attendance optional but highly recommended. All postgraduates are welcome to present or attend -- whether MA, MPhil, PhD, Visitors, etc. Useful InfoThe WIP is a unique opportunity for graduates to develop their presenting and writing skills, take risks, test out ideas, and receive constructive feedback from peers.
Presentations need not be watertight or polished pieces at all. You are encouraged to present work at all stages of the writing process. Should you present?Are you a postgraduate? Then yes, you should present. |
NEXT TALKRozemin Keshvani (PhD) Kant Thursday 25/06/2026 5pm - 6:15pm S1.50 ORGANISERS |
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Postgraduate Work in Progress Seminar
This week, the seminar will discuss Giulia Lorenzi's paper How to Make Sense of Different Musical Perceptual Experiences: a New Philosophical Proposal. Guilia will be interviewed by Johannes Roessler
Abstract:
The common-sense intuitive idea that a musician with extended musical knowledge can perceive music in a different way than a na茂ve listener seems both appealing and problematic. Indeed, given the standard understanding of perception in the philosophical realm as the theory-neutral apprehension of information, it is not clear how musical knowledge can inform and enhance perception of music. In this paper, I suggest that we need to rethink how we characterise auditory perception to make sense of different musical perceptual experiences. Following O鈥橲haughnessy (2000) and Crowther (2009), I introduce the distinction between listening and hearing. I then show how considering listening as an action makes possible to explain two different components at play in musical training and music perception: a mere perceptual one and a theoretic-perceptual other. I finally show, how the attempts previously made in philosophy to characterise this experience fails to explain some crucial aspects of this case.