Postgraduate "Work In Progress" Seminar
Postgraduate Work-In-Progress SeminarA weekly seminar for Philosophy postgraduates to present their in-progress work, followed by a well-spirited trip to the pub. OverviewThe WIP provides a risk-free and supportive space for postgraduates to present their work and receive feedback from other graduates and faculty.
Attendance optional but highly recommended. All postgraduates are welcome to present or attend -- whether MA, MPhil, PhD, Visitors, etc. Useful InfoThe WIP is a unique opportunity for graduates to develop their presenting and writing skills, take risks, test out ideas, and receive constructive feedback from peers.
Presentations need not be watertight or polished pieces at all. You are encouraged to present work at all stages of the writing process. Should you present?Are you a postgraduate? Then yes, you should present. |
NEXT TALKRozemin Keshvani (PhD) Kant Thursday 25/06/2026 5pm - 6:15pm S1.50 ORGANISERS |
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WiP Seminar
Our next postgraduate Work in Progress (WiP) seminar is taking place this Thursday 23rd November from 5-6:15 PM in S2.77 and on Teams. Fridolin Neumann will present 'Heidegger on Kant and Ontological Intuition'. Everyone welcome!
Abstract:
In the 1920s and 1930s, Heidegger intensively engaged with Kant鈥檚 philosophy in a way that he himself acknowledges as 鈥渧iolent鈥� since it always attempts to capture the unsaid in the written word. My talk revolves around a crucial claim Heidegger makes about Kant鈥檚 theory of cognition, evoking discomfort in every loyal Kantian: 鈥渒nowing is primarily intuiting [Erkennen ist prim盲r Anschauen].鈥� I argue that in order to understand what is at stake here this claim must be interpreted along the lines of Heidegger鈥檚 distinction between ontic and ontological cognition (that is, cognition of entities on the one hand and cognition of being transcendentally determining our encounter with entities on the other hand). As I propose, the supposed primacy of intuition mainly refers to ontological cognition and hereby offers an account of human responsiveness to ontological norms which determine our ontic experience of entities in the first place. In Heidegger鈥檚 account, this (ontological) responsiveness is cashed out in terms of intuition which is structurally similar to (ontic) intuition involved in sensible perception. I proceed by first elaborating on the distinction between ontic and ontological cognition to then argue why Heidegger鈥檚 thesis about intuition should be understood as referring to the latter. After that, I sketch what it means to understand ontological cognition in terms of intuition.