91¸£Àû

Skip to main content Skip to navigation

Postgraduate "Work In Progress" Seminar

Postgraduate Work-In-Progress Seminar

A weekly seminar for Philosophy postgraduates to present their in-progress work, followed by a well-spirited trip to the pub.


Overview

The WIP provides a risk-free and supportive space for postgraduates to present their work and receive feedback from other graduates and faculty.

  • When: Every Thursday (5pm to 6:15pm)
  • Where: Room S1.50 (Social Sciences Building, First Floor)
  • What: Presentation + Q&A

Attendance optional but highly recommended. All postgraduates are welcome to present or attend -- whether MA, MPhil, PhD, Visitors, etc.


Useful Info

The WIP is a unique opportunity for graduates to develop their presenting and writing skills, take risks, test out ideas, and receive constructive feedback from peers.

  • Presentation: 30 minutes
  • Open Discussion / Q&A: 40 minutes
  • Material: Work in progress (essay drafts, thesis sections, a substantial set of notes, ... ).
  • Style: Flexible. Slides, handouts, or neither.
  • Audience: No prior reading or background knowledge expected. All are encouraged to attend and present (including visiting postgraduates).

Presentations need not be watertight or polished pieces at all. You are encouraged to present work at all stages of the writing process.


Should you present?

Are you a postgraduate? Then yes, you should present.

 
NEXT TALK

Rozemin Keshvani

(PhD)

Kant


Thursday 25/06/2026

5pm - 6:15pm

S1.50


ORGANISERS

Tiago Rodrigues

Lucas Menezes 

   

 

Show all calendar items

RESCHEDULED FOR 17 AUGUST: 'Enquiry' Seminar Series

- Export as iCalendar
Location: By Zoom

Guest Speaker: Simon Wimmer (TU Dortmund)

Title: 'Cook Wilson's Inquiry Argument for the Indefinability of Knowledge'

Cook Wilson's Inquiry Argument for the Indefinability of Knowledge
Can knowledge be defined? In his (1926) Statement and Inference, John
Cook Wilson answers 'no' to this question. He offers two arguments for
his answer. The first turns on the claim that definitions of knowledge
will inevitably be circular; the second on the claim that we cannot even
inquire into what the definition of knowledge is. This paper focuses on
the second of these arguments. We attempt a detailed reconstruction of
the argument and survey what might be said in defense of its central
premises.

Show all calendar items

Let us know you agree to cookies