Postgraduate "Work In Progress" Seminar
Postgraduate Work-In-Progress SeminarA weekly seminar for Philosophy postgraduates to present their in-progress work, followed by a well-spirited trip to the pub. OverviewThe WIP provides a risk-free and supportive space for postgraduates to present their work and receive feedback from other graduates and faculty.
Attendance optional but highly recommended. All postgraduates are welcome to present or attend -- whether MA, MPhil, PhD, Visitors, etc. Useful InfoThe WIP is a unique opportunity for graduates to develop their presenting and writing skills, take risks, test out ideas, and receive constructive feedback from peers.
Presentations need not be watertight or polished pieces at all. You are encouraged to present work at all stages of the writing process. Should you present?Are you a postgraduate? Then yes, you should present. |
NEXT TALKRozemin Keshvani (PhD) Kant Thursday 25/06/2026 5pm - 6:15pm S1.50 ORGANISERS |
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Postgraduate Work in Progress Seminar
This session will feature a paper from PhD student Carline Klijnman, who will be interviewed by Benjamin Ferguson. The abstract for Carline鈥檚 paper is below. We look forward to seeing you there!
Epistemic Injustice and Expertise
A fundamental characterization of modern societies is epistemic dependence. We rely on (expert-)testimony of others to inform ourselves on complex, politically relevant matters. Especially in the online epistemic environment, the increasing spread of misinformation and the disintermediation of traditional epistemic gatekeepers (a combination I call Epistemic Pollution) have made it harder for citizens to determine the credibility of different information sources.
Take for example the vaccination debate. In anti-vaccination echo-chambers, the testimony of health-care experts is persistently undermined, whilst the anecdotal stories of concerned parents claiming their child鈥檚 disease was caused by vaccination are believed without evidence. These mechanisms of distrust seem to echo Miranda Fricker鈥檚 account of 鈥榯estimonial injustice鈥�, wherein the speaker 鈥渞eceives a credibility deficit owing to identity prejudice in the hearer鈥�. However, unlike Fricker鈥檚 central cases of systematic testimonial injustice, prejudice against healthcare experts is not rooted in social injustice. Still, as I will argue, the severity of testimonial injustice shouldn鈥檛 be measured only by its impact on the individual speaker. Structural prejudice, even if not rooted in social injustice (e.g. against healthcare experts) can undermine epistemically fair conditions of public discourse (in this case re. vaccination debate). This is both epistemically and ethically problematic.
Please contact Johan Heemskerk for further information (j.heemskerk@warwick.ac.uk)