Postgraduate "Work In Progress" Seminar
Postgraduate Work-In-Progress SeminarA weekly seminar for Philosophy postgraduates to present their in-progress work, followed by a well-spirited trip to the pub. OverviewThe WIP provides a risk-free and supportive space for postgraduates to present their work and receive feedback from other graduates and faculty.
Attendance optional but highly recommended. All postgraduates are welcome to present or attend -- whether MA, MPhil, PhD, Visitors, etc. Useful InfoThe WIP is a unique opportunity for graduates to develop their presenting and writing skills, take risks, test out ideas, and receive constructive feedback from peers.
Presentations need not be watertight or polished pieces at all. You are encouraged to present work at all stages of the writing process. Should you present?Are you a postgraduate? Then yes, you should present. |
NEXT TALKRozemin Keshvani (PhD) Kant Thursday 25/06/2026 5pm - 6:15pm S1.50 ORGANISERS |
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PG Work in Progress Seminar
Oscar North-Concar (PhD)
Title: Thick concepts and Objectivity; Assessing Vayrynen's Pragmatic view.
Thursday 26th in S2.77 and on teams. Everyone welcomed!
Abstract:
Moral and ethical concepts are sometimes divided into two categories, 鈥榯hin鈥� and 鈥榯hick鈥�. The difference can be characterised in the following way: when we describe an action thinly as 鈥榳rong鈥�, we evaluate it negatively. However, when we evaluate an action with a thick concept like 鈥榮elfish鈥� or 鈥榗ruel鈥�, we also describe the way in which it is wrong. Bernard Williams uses the notion of thick concepts to challenge the idea that objectivity is possible in the domain of ethics through claiming that they are both central to ethics and constitutively linked with particular ethical outlooks. However, the notion of thick concepts has proven to be problematic. The coherency of any metaethical view that puts thick concepts front and centre stage has been challenged on the grounds that there might not be anything distinctively significant about them after all. In this paper I鈥檒l explore this tension. Specifically, I鈥檒l discuss an argument from Pekka Vayrynen (2013) that claims thick concepts do not have distinctive significance. I aim to argue that Vayrynen does not demonstrate that thick concepts have no bearing on questions surrounding objectivity in ethics.