Postgraduate "Work In Progress" Seminar
Postgraduate Work-In-Progress SeminarA weekly seminar for Philosophy postgraduates to present their in-progress work, followed by a well-spirited trip to the pub. OverviewThe WIP provides a risk-free and supportive space for postgraduates to present their work and receive feedback from other graduates and faculty.
Attendance optional but highly recommended. All postgraduates are welcome to present or attend -- whether MA, MPhil, PhD, Visitors, etc. Useful InfoThe WIP is a unique opportunity for graduates to develop their presenting and writing skills, take risks, test out ideas, and receive constructive feedback from peers.
Presentations need not be watertight or polished pieces at all. You are encouraged to present work at all stages of the writing process. Should you present?Are you a postgraduate? Then yes, you should present. |
NEXT TALKRozemin Keshvani (PhD) Kant Thursday 25/06/2026 5pm - 6:15pm S1.50 ORGANISERS |
|
|
|
PG Work in Progress Seminar
This week, Emily Bassett (PhD) will present "What do we mean by a moral emotion?: Responding to De Sousa". Everyone welcome!
Abstract:
When it comes to morality and the emotions, we seem to be drawn to the idea that certain emotions are more salient to morality than others. Emotions such as guilt, shame and resentment appear to be more distinctly moral to us than sadness or joy. However, attempts to explain what makes some emotions more distinctly moral than others - to single out a coherent group of 'moral emotions - have largely been unsuccessful. In light of this, De Sousa has argued that our intuitions are mistaken. All emotions are equally relevant to morality. In this talk, I will argue that De Sousa's argument rests on two assumptions. First, on the assumption that emotions are on par with other intentional states such as belief in how they connect with morality. As beliefs are moral when they have moral content, emotions are moral when they have moral content. Second, on the assumption that this is the only salient connection that can be made between the emotions and morality. If we reject this second assumption, we leave open the possibility of distinguishing moral from non-moral emotions.