Postgraduate "Work In Progress" Seminar
Postgraduate Work-In-Progress SeminarA weekly seminar for Philosophy postgraduates to present their in-progress work, followed by a well-spirited trip to the pub. OverviewThe WIP provides a risk-free and supportive space for postgraduates to present their work and receive feedback from other graduates and faculty.
Attendance optional but highly recommended. All postgraduates are welcome to present or attend -- whether MA, MPhil, PhD, Visitors, etc. Useful InfoThe WIP is a unique opportunity for graduates to develop their presenting and writing skills, take risks, test out ideas, and receive constructive feedback from peers.
Presentations need not be watertight or polished pieces at all. You are encouraged to present work at all stages of the writing process. Should you present?Are you a postgraduate? Then yes, you should present. |
NEXT TALKRozemin Keshvani (PhD) Kant Thursday 25/06/2026 5pm - 6:15pm S1.50 ORGANISERS |
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PG Work in Progress Seminar
This week's PG WiP Seminar will be led by Chris Hall (MA)
Title: "Debunker or Global Skeptic: Considering the Distinctiveness of Evolutionary Debunking Arguments "
Thursday March 2nd 2023
5pm in S2.77 and on .
Everyone welcome!
Abstract:
For the moral realist, both evolutionary debunking arguments and global skepticism present a challenge to the possibility of moral knowledge. Debunkers typically see their challenge as distinct from broader forms of skepticism, the thought being that they target moral knowledge specifically and depend on a particular empirical claim about the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs. The importance of this distinctiveness is illustrated by the fact that a common response to the debunker is to suggest that the argument leads to global skepticism. In this paper, I examine the relationship between evolutionary debunking arguments and global skepticism. I argue that it is essential to the debunker鈥檚 project to avoid committing to a broader skepticism, and consider various ways in which this commitment can occur. I claim that avoiding this requires formulating the debunking argument in a specific way. A number of evolutionary debunking arguments fall short on this front. To illustrate the problem, I consider a recent paper from Isserow (2019) which presents an evolutionary debunking argument based on our apparent ignorance of how evolution shaped our moral beliefs. On my account, Isserow鈥檚 argument leads to global skepticism. Moreover, Isserow鈥檚 argument is instructive when considering both whether other debunking arguments do the same and how the problem can be avoided.
Teams link: