Postgraduate "Work In Progress" Seminar
Postgraduate Work-In-Progress SeminarA weekly seminar for Philosophy postgraduates to present their in-progress work, followed by a well-spirited trip to the pub. OverviewThe WIP provides a risk-free and supportive space for postgraduates to present their work and receive feedback from other graduates and faculty.
Attendance optional but highly recommended. All postgraduates are welcome to present or attend -- whether MA, MPhil, PhD, Visitors, etc. Useful InfoThe WIP is a unique opportunity for graduates to develop their presenting and writing skills, take risks, test out ideas, and receive constructive feedback from peers.
Presentations need not be watertight or polished pieces at all. You are encouraged to present work at all stages of the writing process. Should you present?Are you a postgraduate? Then yes, you should present. |
NEXT TALKBen Long (PhD) Scepticism Thursday 04/06/2026 5pm - 6:15pm S1.50 ORGANISERS |
|
|
|
PG WiP Seminar - Emma Clinton: DECEPTION & THE ETHICS OF CONSENT
Abstract
How we determine the scope of consent – the range of actions that consent applies to – has implications on the discussion of deception in sex.
Some philosophers endorse the view that deception鈥檚 moral effect on consent can be, at least partly, explained by the fact that an act that someone consented to is not actually the act that is carried out (where the act carried out does not fall within the scope of their consent). If this is the case, then delineating which acts are within the scope of consent can provide us with a partial account of which acts could be morally impermissible as a result of deception.
However, this approach needs to be able to deal with cases where deception might be the only way in which to avoid discriminatory consequences, ideally avoiding the conclusion that deception in these cases are serious moral wrongs.
I will be looking at Dougherty鈥檚 approach to get around this problem, namely building in moral reasonableness into how we determine the scope of consent. I will be arguing that this approach fails, and that if we want consent to remain a useful moral concept which is able to protect people鈥檚 autonomy, the scope of consent should be an epistemically reasonable interpretation of the expression of consent.